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INTRODUCTION 
In the 'late 1980s, a series of well-publicized defense contractor 
abuses brought the ordinarily obscure topic of government contracting 
into the public eye.1 These abuses included not only instances of 
seemingly wasteful charges, like the infamous $600 toilet seat, ap­
proved by a complicit Department of Defense,2 but also examples of 
truly fraudulent activity such as knowingly overbilling and supplying 
inferior quality goods.3 The fraud cases grabbed the public attention 
for three primary reasons. First, enormous sums of money were in-
1. See Major Fraud Act of 1988: Hearings on H.R. 3500 and H.R. 3911 Before the Sub­
comm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, lOOth Cong. 100 (1987) [hereinafter 
House Hearings] ;  William S. Malarkey, Government Contract Fraud, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
875, 875-76 (1989); David C. Morrison, Pentagon Scandals Recur Despite Waves of Reform, 
BALT. SUN, July 10, 1988, at lE, referenced in The Major Fraud Act, and the Government 
Fraud Law Enforcement Act of 1987: Hearings on H.R. 3911 and S. 1958 Before the Sen. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, lOOth Cong. 4 (1988) [hereinafter Senate Hearings]. 
2. See House Hearings, supra note 1, at 5; Edward Walsh, President's Defense Appeal 
Finds Little Support on Hill Wary of Waste, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 1986, at AS. 
3. See Charles P. Alexander, Crime in the Suites, TIME, June 10, 1985, at 56. 
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volved.4 Second, the nature of the fraud often posed a direct danger to 
United States troops, potentially compromising "national security."5 
Finally, large contractors, perceived as the perpetrators of the fraud, 
were apparently going unpunished.6 
In response, Congress passed the Major Fraud Act of 1988 ("the 
Act").7 Congress intended the Act to "provide federal prosecutors 
with an additional criminal statute targeting major procurement fraud 
committed against the United States." 8 As a general matter, prosecu­
tion under the Act is limited to "major fraud": instances where the 
value of the contract exceeds $1,000,000.9 
A substantial portion of all federal government expenditures is 
paid to contractors. For example, the Defense Department alone 
spends more than $200,000,000 annually on contractors, accounting for 
fourteen percent of all federal spending in 1997.1 0 As in the private 
sector, prime contractors - the party that has privity with the ultimate 
client, in this case the federal government - frequently enter into 
subcontracts. In those cases, subcontractors perform services or supply 
or manufacture goods for the government. 
The role of the subcontractor includes a range of functions from 
supplying components to be included in a final product or providing 
some service to the prime contractor, to performing essentially the en­
tire prime contract. In the latter case, the prime contractor's role may 
4. See Elizabeth Tucker, Two Contractors Targeted in Defense Fraud Probe, WASH. 
POST, Sept. 17, 1986, at D14 (discussing two cases involving losses suffered by the govern­
ment on the order of $100 million). 
5. See Eric Pianin, Faulty Parts Still Aboard Navy Ships; Sen. Nunn Calls Risk to Mili­
tary Personnel 'Outrageous,' WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 1987, at A21. 
6. See House Hearings, supra note 1, at 100 (" We have documented . . .  quite a few ex­
amples of where we thought what I call some of the big boys got away."); Kathleen Day, 
Motorola to Plead Guilty to Fraud, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 1988, at Al6 (discussing a plea 
bargain under which the contractor paid fines but no individuals were prosecuted and the 
company was not barred from future contracts). The defense industry's dismissive attitude 
toward the issue also may have fueled the strong public and congressional reaction. See 
Sandra Sugawara, Defense Probe Is Decried as A 'Lynch Mob': Aerospace Lobbyist Denies 
Rampant Fraud, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 1988, at D2. 
7. Pub. L. No. 100-700, § 2(a), 102 Stat. 4631 (codified at 18 U. S.C. § 1031 (1994)). The 
Act was amended in 1989 to add provisions rewarding "whistle-blowers" financially. Major 
Fraud Act Amendments of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-123, 103 Stat. 759. Not coincidentally, 1988 
was also an election year. See Brian T. FitzPatrick, Congressional Re-election Through Sym­
bolic Politics: The Enhanced Banking Crime Penalties, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 47 (1994). 
8. S. REP. NO. 100-503, at 1 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U. S.C.C.A.N. 5969, 5969. 
9. See 18 U. S.C. § 1031(a). The threshold was adopted, in part, to focus attention on 
large contractors who were not deterred by existing punishments. See H. R. REP. No. 100-
610, at 5 (1988). 
10. The Federal Page: Dividing Defense Dollars, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 1998, at A23. 
December 2000] Prosecution of Minor Subcontractors 671 
be limited to taking a fee or a markup and conducting contract ad­
ministration with the government.1 1  
In 1996, defendants Edwin and John Brooks and their company, 
B & D Electric, appealed convictions under the Act to the Fourth 
Circuit.1 2 B & D Electric had fraudulently mislabeled and misrepre­
sented the specifications of components supplied to two United States 
Navy prime contractors.13 Although both prime contracts were valued 
at more than $1,000,000, B & D Electric's subcontracts were each val­
ued at much less than the statutory threshold. 14 Brooks contended on 
appeal that because B & D Electric's subcontracts did not exceed the 
$1,000,000 threshold, he could not be prosecuted under the Act.1 5 
The Fourth Circuit rejected Brooks's claim. In performing a de­
tailed evaluation of the Act's language and legislative history, as well 
as policy concerns underlying the Act, the court held that the Act ap­
plied to cases where the prime contract, but not necessarily the spe­
cific subcontract, exceeded the $1,000,000 threshold.1 6 The court be­
lieved that this interpretation would enable prosecutors to combat the 
fraud identified by Congress more effectively.1 7 
The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that its holding conflicted with 
the conclusion reached by the Second Circuit.1 8 In United States v. 
Nadi,19 the Second Circuit concluded that the Act did not apply if the 
specific subcontract under which fraud was committed did not exceed 
$1,000,000.20 The Nadi court also addressed the statutory language and 
legislative history of the Act and the policy concerns underlying the 
Act in reaching this decision. 21 Although the scopes of the analyses 
were similar, the two courts reached opposite conclusions.2 2 
11. See 8 JOHN COSGROVE MCBRIDE & THOMAS S. TOUHEY, GOVERNMENT 
CONTRACTS§§ 49.10-49.30 (2001). 
12. United States v. Brooks, 111F.3d 365 (4th Cir. 1997). 
13. See id. at 368. 
14. The values of the two prime contracts were $9,000,000 and $5,000,000; the values of 
B & D Electric's respective subcontracts were $51,544 and $1,470. Id. at 368. 
15. Id. at 368. 
16. Id. at 368-70. 
17. Id. at 369-70. 
18. Id. at 369. 
19. 996 F.2d 548 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U. S. 933 (1993). 
20. See Nadi, 996 F.2d at 551. Because the value of the subcontract involved in Nadi did 
exceed $1,000,000, the conclusion was distinguished by the Brooks court, among other rea­
sons, as dicta. Brooks, 111 F.3d at 369. The Second Circuit, however, did explicitly adopt the 
rule: "[A] reasonable reading of the statute, in light of the legislative history, requires that 
we adopt the rule . . .  whereby the value of the contract is determined by looking to the spe­
cific contract upon which the fraud is based." Id. 
21. Id. at 551-52. The Supreme Court of Connecticut also implicitly adopted the Nadi 
interpretation by assuming that the value of a procurement contract exceeded $1,000,000 
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This Note adopts the Fourth Circuit's position and argues that 
courts should read the Act to impose liability on contractors and sub­
contractors when the value of the prime contract exceeds $1,000,000, 
even if the subcontract itself is less than $1,000,000. Part I of this Note 
examines the statute and concludes that both the specific text on li­
ability and the statute taken as a whole support liability for "low­
value" 23 subcontractors. Because the mere existence of the disagree­
ment between the circuits suggests some ambiguity in the statute itself, 
Part II examines the legislative history of the Act. It concludes that 
Congress knew the Act would apply to low-value subcontractors and, 
more generally, was openly hostile to business groups' efforts to limit 
the scope of the Act. Part III discusses the benefits of judicial and 
prosecutorial clarity as well as the symbolic value of use of a statute 
specifically tailored to the crime of contract fraud, and counters argu­
ments that prosecution of low-value subcontractors is unfair. The Note 
concludes that these arguments support prosecution of low-value sub­
contractors and accordingly recommends that courts adopt the Fourth 
Circuit's position when faced with this issue in the future. 
I. FIRST THINGS FIRST: THE STATUTE 
This Part examines the statute from two different perspectives -
the specific text prescribing liability and the Act as a whole - and 
concludes that the Act extends to subcontractors and imposes liability 
when either the prime contract or the subcontract exceeds $1,000,000. 
A. The Statutory Limit on Liability 
Statutory interpretation begins with the text of the statute,24 and 
the text here should be read as imposing liability on low-value subcon­
tractors. The statutory language prescribing liability reads: 
Whoever knowingly executes ... any scheme or artifice with the intent to 
defraud the United States ... in any procurement of property or services 
when holding that discharging an employee who resisted participation in the fraud violated 
public policy. See Faulkner v. United Tech. Corp., 693 A.2d 293, 296 n.6 ( Conn. 1997). 
22. Compare Brooks, 111 F.3d at 368, with Nadi, 996 F.2d at 551; see also Major 
Wallace, Federal Circuits Split on Application of the Major Fraud Act to Government Con· 
tracts, ARMY LAW., Nov. 1997, at 41 (summarizing the development of the split). Since the 
split developed in 1997, the Third Circuit recognized the division but avoided the question. 
See United States v. Sain, 141 F.3d 463, 472 (3d Cir. 1998). This issue has not been addressed 
within the remaining circuit courts of appeal. 
23. This Note will use the term "low-value " to refer to contracts or subcontracts under 
$1,000,000. This Note assumes that the prime contract with the United States is valued at 
more than $1,000,000 unless otherwise noted. 
24. See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U. S. 681, 685 (1985) ("It is axiomatic that 
'(t]he starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is the language itself.' " 
(alteration in original) (citation omitted)). 
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as a prime contractor with the United States or as a subcontractor or 
supplier on a contract with the United States, if the value of the contract, 
subcontract, or any constituent part thereof, for such property or services 
is $1,000,000 or more shall ... be fined ... or imprisoned . . . .  25 
A simple reading of this language leads to the conclusion that any con­
tractor, subcontractor, or supplier who commits fraud can be liable if 
any component of the contract exceeds $1,000,000. 2 6  Because the stat­
ute reads "any constituent part," 27 satisfaction of the dollar threshold 
need not be achieved through the fraudulent actor's own contract.28 
Furthermore, the statute's use of the word "or" within the list of par­
ties who are potentially liable indicates an intent to include all such 
parties as potential defendants. 
This reading of the statute also accords with the canon of interpre­
tation requiring that the statute be interpreted so as to give effect to 
each word of the statute. 29 At first blush, one might argue that an in­
terpretation that relies only on the value of the contract and ignores 
the subcontract reads out the term "subcontract" from the statutory 
language. Jo To say that any prime contract with a value over $1,000,000 
satisfies the threshold yet the value of the subcontract does not matter 
seems to leave the latter term meaningless. J1 Accordingly, this argu­
ment suggests that, to comport with the canon of construction, low­
value subcontractors should not be covered by the Act. The term 
"subcontract," however, does have meaning when a subcontractor is 
awarded a subcontract valued at more than $1,000,000 by a prime con­
tractor who itself does not hold a $1,000,000 contract directly with the 
government. As the court explained in Brooks: 
[I]f a prime contractor had entered into three separate contracts, agree­
ing under each to supply the United States with $ 750,000 worth of 
equipment, but entered into a single supply contract with a subcontractor 
for $1 million worth of parts, the subcontractor would be covered by the 
Act.J2 
25. 18 U.S.C. § 1031(a) (1994) (emphasis added). 
26. See United States v. Brooks, 111 F.3d 365, 368-69 (4th Cir. 1997) ("From a straight­
forward reading of this statute ...  any contractor or supplier involved with a prime con­
tract ...  is guilty so long as the prime contract, a subcontract, a supply agreement, or any 
constituent part of such a contract is valued at $1 million or more."). 
27. 18 U. S. C. § 1031(a) (emphasis added). 
28. See Brooks, 111 F.3d at 370. 
29. E.g., United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 35 (1992); United States v. 
Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955) ("It is our duty 'to give effect, if possible, to every 
clause and word of a statute . ..  .' " (citation omitted)). 
30. The statute reads "if the value of the contract, subcontract, or any constituent 
part . . .  is $1,000,000 or more . . .. " 18 U.S.C. § 1031(a). 
31. This follows from the seemingly reasonable, though incorrect, assumption that the 
value of the subcontract must always be less than that of the prime contract. 
32. Brooks, 111 F.3d at 370. 
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Although perhaps unusual, the circumstances described by the Brooks 
court give effect to all the statute's language.33 
Although the Second Circuit found that the only relevant contract 
value was that of the contract under which the fraud occurred,34 its in­
terpretation depends on logic flawed by reliance on unpersuasive defi­
nitions of statutory terms. The primary basis for that court's interpre­
tation was the conclusion that the phrase "if the value of the contract, 
subcontract, or any constituent part thereof" tracks the preceding 
phrase, which reads "as a prime contractor with the United States or 
as a subcontractor or supplier on a contract in which there is a prime 
contract. . . .  "35 In sum, the Second Circuit interpreted this language to 
mean that "where the prime contractor is accused of fraud, we look to 
the value of the prime contract, but where the subcontractor is ac­
cused of fraud we look to the value of the subcontract, and where the 
supplier is accused of fraud we look to the value of the related con­
stituent part of the contract."36 Closer examination, however, reveals 
that the two phrases should not be interpreted to have tracking, or 
parallel, structures. 
The primary error in this interpretation is that it improperly as­
sumes mutual exclusivity among the three terms in each series. In 
other words, the Second Circuit assumes that a contractor is not a sub­
contractor is not a supplier, and a contract is not a subcontract is not a 
"constituent part." The terms "supplier" and "constituent part," how­
ever, do not unambiguously exclude the other terms. Rather, both the 
general meaning and the trade usage of the language suggest that con­
tractors, and certainly subcontractors, are "suppliers."37 Similarly, a 
subcontract is not plainly distinct from a constituent part, and the in­
clusive interpretation of "constituent part" is further emphasized by 
33. Moreover, the legislative history reveals that such circumstances are not merely a 
post hoc contrivance to give effect (artificially) to the language but rather were explicitly 
intended by Congress to be subject to the Act. See infra note 103 and accompanying text. 
34. United States v. Nadi, 996 F.2d 548, 551 (2d Cir. 1993) ("[A] reasonable reading of 
the statute, in light of the legislative history, requires that we adopt the rule . . .  whereby the 
value of the contract is determined by looking to the specific contract upon which the fraud 
is based. "). 
35. See Nadi, 996 F.2d at 551 (quoting 18 U. S. C. § 1031(a)). 
36. Id. 
37. See MacEvoy Co. v. United States, 322 U.S. 102, 108-11 (1944) (holding that the 
Miller Act does not define the terms subcontractor and supplier, and that the meaning of the 
terms must be found in the usage of the trade); Graham, Van Leer & Elmore Co., Inc. v. 
Jones & Wood, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 667, 669 (D.D. C. 1987) (implying that the terms subcon­
tractor and supplier are interchangeable in a common law contract case); Technassociates, 
Inc. v. United States, 14 Cl. Ct. 200, 205-206 (1988) (quoting Government Standard Form 
No. 1436, a settlement proposal, which states that "[t]he term 'subcontractors,' . . .  includes 
suppliers "). 
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the word "any."3 8 Most strikingly, no standard or trade definitions 
suggest correlation of a "constituent part" to a "supplier," as is vital to 
the Second Circuit's construction.39 
The loose and overlapping definitions of these terms fulfill the 
purpose of creating broad coverage of the law,40 but are not compati­
ble with an attempt to define precise, tracking definitions.41 Because 
the Second Circuit used flawed logic to determine that the contract­
subcontract-component part series tracked the contractor­
subcontractor-supplier series, other courts should not follow the re­
sulting conclusion that only the subcontract value is dispositive with 
respect to subcontractor liability. Instead, courts should adopt the 
more straightforward reading of the Fourth Circuit, which follows the 
text by simply looking at the value of "any" part. 
B. The Statute as a Whole 
In addition to the specific text at issue, a broader examination of 
the statute supports the conclusion that the Act should apply to low­
value subcontractors.4 2 This Section examines three issues concerning 
the larger contours of the statute: the magnitude of the fraud, the stat­
ute of limitations, and the target of the fraud. It concludes that these 
broader themes support application not only to prime contractors, but 
to low-value subcontractors as well. 
The Act does not look to the magnitude of the fraud when estab­
lishing liability.43 Rather, it looks to the value of a contract.44 Thus, 
while a potential objection to the Fourth Circuit's broad interpretation 
is that it is unfair to subcontractors because the magnitude of the fraud 
38. 18 U.S.C. § 1031(a). See Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 587-89 
(1980) (indicating the importance of the phrase "any other final action"). 
39. See Nadi, 996 F.2d at 551 ("[ W]here the supplier is accused of fraud we look to the 
value of the related constituent part of the contract. "). 
40. See infra note 111 and accompanying text (discussing goal of an expansive statute). 
41. Moreover, the legislative history reveals that Congress added these two clauses to 
the bill at two separate points in time by two different bodies, suggesting no intent that the 
phrases "tracked " as a matched pair. See H.R. 3911, lOOth Cong. (1988) (adding the 
contract-subcontract-constituent part clause); 134 CONG. REC. 31569 (1988) (adding the 
contractor-subcontractor-supplier clause). 
42. See Richards v. United States, 369 U. S. 1, 11 (1962) (holding that a particular statu­
tory interpretation should be considered with respect to the larger goals and policies em­
bodied in the statute); NORMAN J. SINGER, 2A STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUC­
TION § 46.05 (1992). 
43. The magnitude of the fraud means the amount of money that the government loses 
as a result of the fraud. This amount would include the unjust enrichment enjoyed by the 
fraudulent actor, as well as costs associated with correcting the effects of the fraud. See infra 
note 153 and accompanying text. 
44. 18 U.S.C. § 1031(a). 
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may be small,4 5 on its face the Act applies to all prime contractors with 
$1,000,000 contracts, regardless of the magnitude of the fraud.4 6 
Congress did require looking to the magnitude of the fraud in portions 
of the Act that address damages, showing that consideration of the 
magnitude is important in some instances.47 The threshold question of 
liability, however, is not such an instance.48 While applying the Act to 
cases where the size of the fraud is small may appear harsh, it is undis­
puted that the Act applies to prime contractors in such cases, and 
there is no justification to treat subcontractors differently.49 
The importance of the contract value rather than the fraud value is 
demonstrated by the facts of United States v. Sain.50 In Sain the defen­
dant committed fraud by using less expensive regenerated carbon in a 
water treatment plant constructed and operated for the Army after 
specifying that it would need to use more expensive virgin carbon.51 
Supplying this carbon was not included in the original $5,000,000 con­
tract, and so was addressed in a series of three contract modifications, 
each for $27,500, in which Sain charged the Army for virgin carbon.52 
The Third Circuit held that, even though the component part (the 
modification) was less than $1,000,000, the modifications did not stand 
alone but were incorporated elements of the prime contract; thus, the 
Act applied based on the value of the prime contract.53 These facts 
parallel the subcontractor situation in which a low-value component 
part is attached to a prime contract. 
Another aspect of the Act that supports its application to low­
value subcontractors is the extended statute of limitations. The Act 
45. See United States v. Nadi, 996 F.2d 548, 552 (2d Cir. 1993). Similar objections were 
raised in congressional hearings concerning the Act. See infra note 76 and accompanying 
text. 
46. See 18 U. S. C. § 1031(a). 
47. See 18 U. S.C. § 1031(b) (authorizing enhanced fines when "the gross loss to the 
Government or the gross gain to a defendant is $500,000 or greater .. .  "); 18 U. S. C. § 
1031(d) (authorizing fines "up to twice the amount of the gross loss or gross gain involved in 
the offense . . .  "). 
48. See 18 U.S.C. § 1031(a). 
49. As it turns out, application of the Act to instances of low-magnitude fraud is not so 
harsh after all because fines and sentences under the United States Sentencing Guidelines 
are proportional to the magnitude of the fraud. See infra Section IIl.B. 
50. 141F.3d 463 (3d Cir. 1998). 
51. Id. at 468-69. 
52. Id. at 466-68. 
53. Id. at 472-73 ("(E]ven though Sain used the modifications to defraud the Army, the 
fraud intrinsically involved the approximately $7 million contract. "). The Third Circuit did 
not pass judgment on the similar question of a subcontract between the prime contractor and 
a subcontractor rather than a modification between the prime contractor and the govern­
ment. See id. at 472. 
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grants a seven-year statute of limitations for prosecutions,54 and the 
rationale for an extended statutory period applies to fraud by subcon­
tractors as well as by prime contractors. The longer statutory period 
differentiates the Act from other statutes that could be used to prose­
cute fraud,55 such as the False Claims Act,56 the False Statements Act,57 
and the federal anti-conspiracy statute, 58 all of which are subject to a 
five-year limitations period.59 Congress extended the statutory period 
in response to perceived complexities of major fraud investigations. 6 0  
Therefore, one might incorrectly assume that applying the Act to . 
"simple" subcontractor cases might not be appropriate. 
Investigating subcontractor fraud, however, may be just as com­
plex as investigating prime contractor fraud. Low-dollar fraud may be 
easier to hide within the bulk of a large prime contract. Likewise, 
while large contractors typically have nominal institutional systems to 
detect fraud by their employees, 61 fraud by small subcontractors may 
more often be instigated at the highest levels of the company.62 
Even if not all investigations are complex, Congress's finding that 
some prosecutions require lengthy investigations does not mean that 
all prosecutions must be complex. The Act undisputedly applies to 
cases of prime contractors committing small frauds, whether difficult 
to discover or not. Again, there is no reason to create a special inter­
pretation for subcontractors. 
Moreover, fraud by both prime contractors and subcontractors 
hurts the intended beneficiary of the Act, the United States govern-
54. 18 U. S. C. § 1031(f) (1994). Indeed, the Act is often the last resort for prosecution 
when other counts have been time-barred. See, e.g. , Under Seal v. United States (In re 
Grand Jury Subpoena), 175 F.3d 332, 338 (1999) (" Because the statute of limitations had 
apparently run on a number of the potential criminal charges, the criminal investigation was 
focused solely on whether [the] conduct violated the Major Fraud Act . . ..  "). 
55. See House Hearings, supra note 1, at 77. 
56. 18 u.s.c. §§ 286, 287 (1994). 
57. 18 u.s.c. § 1001 (1994). 
58. See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994). 
59. 18 U. S. C. § 3282 (1994) (specifying a five-year statute of limitations for all non­
capital offenses unless otherwise specified). 
60. The legislative history supports the conclusion that the statutory period was ex­
tended to accommodate complex investigations. See House Hearings, supra note 1, at 42. 
61. See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DOD PROCUREMENT: USE 
AND ADMINISTRATION OF DOD'S VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE PROGRAM 2 (1996) (noting 
that from 1986 to 1994, 138 contractors had detected and voluntarily disclosed potential 
fraud under a DOD program. These contractors represented 48 of the largest 100 contrac­
tors and 90 of the remaining approximately 32,000 contractors.). 
62. See, e.g. , United States v. Brooks, 111 F.3d 365 (4th Cir. 1997). Of course, upper­
level management may be involved in the fraud at large firms also. See Faulkner v. United 
Tech. Corp., 693 A.2d 293 ( Conn. 1997) (employee fired for refusing to participate in 
fraudulent scheme). 
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ment.63 Even if a subcontractor commits the fraudulent act, the loss 
induced is likely to fall eventually on the government via the prime 
contract. For example, in United States v. Spring Works, Inc.,64 sub­
standard springs provided by a subcontractor were used in helicopters, 
cruise missiles, fighter jets, and the space shuttle. The cost to the gov­
ernment to correct the problems was estimated to be over $1,500,000.65 
The subcontract value, however, was reported to be only $160.66 The 
adverse effects to the United States are severe whether a prime con­
tractor or subcontractor commits the fraud. By compromising the exe­
cution of a high-dollar-value contract, subcontractor fraud is equally 
"major" from the perspective of the United States. 
II. POLITIC S AS USUAL: THE LEGI SLATI VE HI STO RY 
Although Part I demonstrates that the Act's text standing alone 
supports application to low-value subcontractors, the existence of a 
split of authority suggests that the text may not completely resolve the 
question. In cases where the language itself is ambiguous, the Supreme 
Court has recognized the validity of seeking guidance from the legisla­
tive history.67 From another perspective, legislative history manifests 
the intent of Congress.6 8 Whether couched in terms of resolving ambi-
63. See 18 U. S. C. § 1031 (a)(l) (1994). 
64. No. C R  86-1112- WM B ( C.D. Cal. April 6, 1987) (sentencing memorandum), re-
printed in House Hearings, supra note 1, at 170. 
65. House Hearings, supra note 1, at 167. 
66. United States v. Brooks, 111 F.3d 365, 369 (4th Cir. 1997). 
67. E.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U. S. 504, 508-09 (1981) (" We begin 
by considering the extent to which the text .. .  answers the question before us. Concluding 
that the text is ambiguous . . .  we then seek guidance from legislative history . . . .  "). 
68. See, e.g., Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Cenance, 452 U.S. 155, 158 n.3 (1981) ("Absent a 
clear indication of legislative intent to the contrary, the statutory language controls construc­
tion."). 
The modern trend is for courts to look to the statutory language above the intent of the 
legislature as indicated in legislative history to assess statutory meaning. See SINGER, supra 
note 42, § 48.02. Justice Scalia, in particular, strongly supports this view of interpretation: 
The meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be determined, not on the basis of 
which meaning can be shown to have been understood by a larger handful of the Members 
of Congress; but rather on the basis of which meaning is (1) most in accord with the context 
and ordinary usage, and thus most likely to have been understood by the whole Congress 
which voted on the words of the statute ... and (2) most compatible with the surrounding 
body of law .... 
Green, 490 U.S. at 528 ( Scalia, J., concurring). 
Others have criticized this textualist approach, noting, for example, that textualists have 
neglected interpretative canons that promote individual liberty or executive authority while 
overusing rules that narrow statutory meaning as a means to promote federalism and states' 
rights. See Brandorf C. Mank, Textualism's Selective Canons of Statutory Construction: Rein­
vigorating Individual Liberties, Legislative Authority, and Deference to Executive Agencies, 
86 KY. L.J. 527, 528 (1998); see also Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation - In the 
Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 822 (1983) ("I know of no princi­
pled, nonpolitical basis for a court to adopt the view that Congress is legislating too much 
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guity or finding intent, courts commonly use legislative history to re­
solve issues of statutory interpretation even though the practice is con­
sidered controversial by some academics, judges, and justices.69 
Part II of this Note examines the Act's legislative history and con­
cludes that Congress intended the Act to apply to subcontractors with 
low-value subcontracts on major prime contracts. Section II.A demon­
strates that, in drafting the Act, Congress specifically supported its ap­
plication to low-value subcontractors. Section 11.B asserts that 
amendments to the statutory language made in response to opponents' 
concerns did not change the underlying liability of subcontractors. 
Section 11.C gives further attention to specific language in the legisla­
tive history that was interpreted differently by the Second and Fourth 
Circuits. 
A. Congress Recognized This Very Problem 
This section asserts that Congress anticipated the Act's application 
to low-value subcontractors and was hostile to those who would ex­
empt such parties. Proceedings of the two House hearings conducted 
to debate the Act indicate Congress's desire to take a hard line on 
fraudulent.actors. The Subcommittee on Crime of the House Judiciary 
Committee held an initial hearing on the Act in December 1987.70 
Witnesses at the December hearing included sponsors of the legisla­
tion, government prosecutors, government auditors, and public 
and ought therefore to be reined in by having its statutes construed strictly. I add now that 
such a view would be a form of judicial activism because it would cut down on the power of 
the legislative branch; and at this moment in history, we do not need more judicial activ­
ism. "). 
Whether legislative history is consulted to "resolve ambiguity " or to assess "intent " may 
be a purely semantic distinction, for, after all, ambiguity can almost always be found if one 
looks hard enough. Cf Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 
442 P.2d 641, 643 ( Cal. 1968) (finding the belief of perfect verbal expression to be a "rem­
nant of a primitive faith " and allowing introduction of extrinsic, parol evidence in an expan­
sive set of contract disputes). This parallel between use of parol evidence and legislative his­
tory, and the trend to weaken the parol evidence rule in contract cases, have been used to 
argue for greater use of legislative history by courts interpreting statutes. See Stephen F. 
Ross & Daniel Tranen, The Modern Paro/ Evidence Rule and Its Implications for New Tex-
tualist Statutory Interpretation, 87 GEO. L.J. 195, 199 (1998). 
. 
69. See Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Originalism in Recent Su­
preme Court Statutory Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative History Debate and Be­
yond, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1, 15 (1998) (reporting the findings of an empirical study showing 
that the Supreme Court invoked legislative history in nearly fifty percent of the statutory 
interpretation cases in 1996). Similarly, a Westlaw search conducted by the author discov­
ered that the United States Courts of Appeals had cited to the United States Code Congres­
sional and Administrative i�ews (U.S.C.C.A.N.) in 340 decisions in 2000. 
70. See House Hearings, supra note 1, at I. 
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"watchdog" interest groups.71 Every witness took a hard line against 
the contracting industry.72 
The Subcommittee held a second hearing in March 1988 to provide 
an opportunity for opponents of the measure to air their views.73 
Representative William Hughes, the sponsor of the bill, greeted these 
witnesses by recalling that the December hearing "documented a story 
of greed, malfeasance and fraud in procurement law that is unaccept­
able,"74 including cases that "can most directly cost Americans their 
lives."75 
During the March hearing, opponents of the Act objected to po­
tential harms to small businesses created by the Act's use of contract 
values to trigger application. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce as­
serted that the Act "would penalize small businesses in ways that are 
both illogical and overwhelming."7 6 The Chamber pointed to the "il­
logical" exposure of small businesses acting as subcontractors,77 the 
71. See id. at III. 
72. See generally id. at 5-6, 149. The subcommittee chairman and sponsor of the bill, 
William Hughes, set the tone with his opening remarks: "In today's hearing, we will discuss a 
disturbing trend of successive scandals in procurements for spare parts, overhead charges, 
malfunctioning equipment and various other fraudulent schemes that bilk the American 
taxpayers of billions of dollars and at the same time diminish their confidence in the Execu­
tive Branch's ability to efficiently administer essential government functions." Id. at 5. 
Similarly: "Simply put, when major fraud occurs, you need a major tool to combat it." 
Id. at 9 (testimony of Sen. Grassley). "We also welcome legislation which will enhance our 
prosecutive efforts and protect the government against those who would cheat or mislead 
it ....  " Id. at 34 (testimony of John Keeney, Deputy Assistant Attorney General). "H.R. 
3500 is a major effort which we welcome in support of our mission of detecting and investi­
gating fraud, waste and abuse within the postal service." Id. at 43 (testimony of Donald 
Davis, U.S. Postal & Inspection Service). "I share the concern of you and our fellow taxpay­
ers about white collar crime in the government contracting environment and, consequently, 
welcome any efforts to prevent it or impose stiff penalties on the perpetrators." Id. at 89 
(testimony of Fred Newton, Defense Contract Audit Agency). "(S]o I hope that the commit­
tee efforts beyond this bill ...  is the kind of thing where ...  you lead the charge in saying to 
the Department of Justice we want to know why these large defense contractors got away 
with this." Id. at 102 (testimony of Dina Rasor, Project on Military Procurement). 
73. See id. at III, 149-50. Witnesses included representatives of the United States Cham­
ber of Commerce, the Electronic Industries Association, and the Professional Services 
Council. 
74. Id. at 149. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 205 (prepared comments of the United States Chamber of Commerce). 
77. Id. ("For example, a small construction firm could be paving a driveway for a large 
government office building. The subcontract could be less than $10,000 out of a $20 million 
contract for that building. If it is guilty of mischarging $1,000 on its work, it could be liable 
for a $40 million fine."). A similar scenario was raised by the Professional Services Council. 
See id. at 285 ("Thus, a subcontractor providing $50,000 in services under a $5 million prime 
contract could be ordered to pay as much as $10 million on a timesheet overcharge of 
$1,000."). At the time, the bill did not include a limit on fines. See H.R. 3911, lOOth Cong. 
(1988). The Act as enacted does include an upper limit of $10,000,000. See 18 U.S.C § 
1031(c) (1994). Moreover, fines are made proportional to the magnitude of the fraud under 
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. See infra Section 111.B. 
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very issue of disagreement between the Second and Fourth Circuits 
addressed by this Note. As a general matter, the opponents of the Act 
wanted to tie application, sentences, and penalties, for both prime con­
tractors as well as subcontractors, to the magnitude of the fraud rather 
than the contract size.78 The opponents also asserted that (1) prosecu­
tion should require a showing of knowing and willful intent,79 (2) the 
Act would devastate small businesses,80 and (3) above all, the Act sim­
ply was not needed.81 
The Committee did not receive the opponents' testimony kindly,82 
and its response demonstrates that it foresaw the possible prosecution 
of low-value subcontractors. The chairman specifically challenged the 
worst-case example posed by the Chamber of Commerce: "First, let 
me just ask you, Mr. Kipps, do you believe the Department of Justice 
would prosecute a subcontractor for a $1,000 mischarge on a $10,000 
subcontract on a $20 million contract and ask for a $40 million fine?"83 
In other words, the Committee, at least, understood that the govern­
ment could prosecute under the Act in such circumstances. Any deci­
sion to prosecute would be discretionary rather than limited by stat­
ute.84 While the magnitude of the fine or sentence; or even the 
likelihood of prosecution, might have been in question, the applicabil­
ity of the Act was not. 
This direct and specific confrontation of the issue, moreover, 
should supersede any broad statement that could suggest a more nar­
row reading of the Act.85 One example of such a broad statement is 
contained in the Senate report, which states that the Act "would apply 
78. See House Hearings, supra note 1, at 191-94 (statement of Clarence Kipps). 
79. See id. at 192. 
80. See id. at 281 (statement of Christopher Cross) ("I would also like to add that we 
believe that H.R. 3911 would serve as a deterrent not to fraud, but to entrepreneurship of 
small businesses. "). 
81. See id. at 192. 
82. See id. at 295 (comments of Rep. Smith) ("Gentlemen, I am sorry that you cannot be 
sitting where we are in a way so that you could have heard yourselves. It is disheartening to 
hear testimony like this . ... "); House Hearings, supra note 1, at 311 (comments of Rep. 
Hughes) ("I have not heard any constructive suggestions. I have only heard criticisms of 
each section of the bill, without fail."); see also H.R. REP. No. 100-610, at 3 (1988). 
83. House Hearings, supra note 1, at 312. Mr. Kipps, representing the United States 
Chamber of Commerce, stated that he did not think that it would, but feared that prosecu­
tors would abusively leverage the possibility during plea bargain negotiations. Representa­
tive Hughes responded that existing statutes also gave prosecutors the potential to wreak 
havoc with a corporation and challenged Mr. Kipps to provide examples of instances when 
the Justice Department had abused the process. Id. 
84. The potential for arbitrary results stemming from prosecutorial discretion is miti­
gated by the equalizing effects of the U. S. Sentencing Guidelines. See infra Section IIl. B. 
85. See Square D Co. v. Niagra Frontier Tariff Bureau, 476 U. S. 409, 420 (1986) ("Peti­
tioners have pointed to no specific statutory provision or legislative history indicating a spe­
cific congressional intention to overturn the . . .  construction; harmony with the general leg­
islative purpose is inadequate for that formidable task. " (citation omitted)). 
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to fraud committed in connection with a contract, or subcontract or 
any part of a contract or subcontract . . .  worth at least $1 Million." 8 6  
Further, Representative McCollum indicated in the House debate that 
some limits exist within the Act: "We are talking now about procure­
ment contracts of $1 Million or more, very visible contracts, not the 
really tiny contracts with the Government." 8 7  Unlike the hearing de­
bate, these examples address neither the application of the Act to a 
subcontractor as opposed to a prime contractor nor the particular is­
sue of low-value subcontractor liability. Given the relative lack of 
specificity, these passages should be considered less persuasive. 
B. Amendments to House Bills 3500 and 3911 
Amendments made to the Act to protect small companies do not 
extend relief to low-value subcontractors because the amendments 
address penalties rather than liabilities and do not distinguish between 
prime and subcontractors. This Section examines amendments made 
to the bill's language during its passage. 8 8  These amendments demon­
strate that rather than limit application to subcontractors, Congress 
made last-minute modifications that resulted in greater application to 
subcontractors than what previously existed. 
The earliest amendments to the bill demonstrate the House's de­
sire to expand, rather than limit, the effects of the Act and to tie li­
ability to the contract value. These amendments lowered the standard 
of proof and increased the maximum possible fine. Specifically, House 
Bill 3911, introduced in February 1988, removed the need to prove 
specific intent, 8 9  and also allowed the alternate fine to be "based upon 
86. S. REP. No. 100-503, at 3 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U. S.C. C.A.N. 5969, 5970; see also 
United States v. Nadi, 996 F.2d 548, 551-52 (2d Cir. 1993). Similarly, House Bill 3500, the 
original bill, was introduced in 1987 to apply "in situations involving $1,000,000 or more. " 
133 CONG. REC. 27988 (1987). 
87. 134 CONG. REC. 10328 (1988). He continued by stating that conditions were placed 
in the bill "to protect the small businessman to make sure what we were dealing [with] . .. is 
truly major fraud . . . . The objective here is not to bankrupt small companies . .. .  " 134 
CONG. REC. 10328 (1988). 
88. For detailed information about these amendments, see H. R. 3911, lOOth Cong. 
(1988). The House Bill 3911 documentation tracks a number of edits and subsequent re­
reportings. Where available, references have been made to House Report 610, which ex­
plains the amendments simply. 
Representative William Hughes first introduced legislation that became the Act as 
House Bill 3500 on October 15, 1987. H.R. REP. No. 100-610, at 2 (1988). On February 3, 
1988, the House Subcommittee on Crime amended House Bill 3500, and the modified ver­
sion was reported to the full committee as a clean bill (House Bill 3911) on February 4, 1988. 
See H. R. REP. No. 100-610, at 5. 
89. This was accomplished by replacing the previous language, taken from the Mail 
Fraud Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994), with language from the Bank Fraud Act, 18 U. S. C. § 
1344 (1994), as had been requested by the Defense and Justice Departments. See H. R. REP. 
No. 100-610, at 5; see also House Hearings, supra note 1, at 39, 77. 
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double the 'value of the contract' rather than the 'object of the 
fraud.' "90 
While other amendments made in April 1988 did provide relief to 
both contractors and subcontractors, they affected only the extent of 
damages, not subcontractor liability.91 The first significant amendment 
changed the maximum alternate fine under the bill from double the 
value of the contract to $10,000,000.92 The second "relief" amendment 
limited the situations under which the "whistleblower" reward could 
be granted.93 These provisions, especially the cap and limitations on 
the fine, do give relief to small businesses and are consistent with the 
recommendations of business interests.94 These amendments, however, 
do not distinguish between contractors and subcontractors. Nor did 
Representative McCollum's comment that the Act's objective was not 
to bankrupt small businesses95 suggest that he was more concerned 
about subcontractors than prime contractors.96 More importantly, the 
provisions address penalties but not liability. 
Further amendments made by the Senate specifically recognized 
that the Act applied to subcontractors but did not distinguish between 
the liabilities of prime contractors and subcontractors.97 First, the Sen-
90. H.R. REP. NO. 100-610, at 5. 
91. See id. at 6. These modifications were based on additional testimony and comments, 
including that of House Bill 39ll's opponents at the March 1988 hearing. See supra note 73 
and accompanying text. Other amendments made at this time further strengthened the bill. 
In particular, one increased the maximum incarceration allowed under the bill from seven 
years to ten years and provided for a mandatory minimum sentence of two years if the of­
fense involved a foreseeable and substantial risk of personal injury. See H.R. REP. No. 100-
610, at 6. This provision was added in response to examples of product substitution fraud 
where, for example, inferior parachute cord was supplied by a contractor. See 134 CONG. 
REC. 10327 (1988). The potential for direct bodily harm distinguishes many examples of de­
fense contractor fraud from the typical white-collar crime scenario. 
92. See H.R. REP. No. 100-610, at 6. This amendment did address what the bill's oppo­
nents thought of as an unfair magnitude of penalty in their worst-case examples. See supra 
note 77 and accompanying text. The amendment further limited the alternate fine provision 
as applicable only when the amount of the fraud exceeded $250,000 or when the fraud in­
volved a substantial risk of personal injury. See H.R. 3911, lOOth Cong. (1988). 
93. See H.R. REP. No. 100-610, at 6. The amendment excluded individuals who partici­
pated in the fraud and those who could have, but failed to prevent the fraud by informing 
the employer. The "whistleblower" protection provision was added with the introduction of 
House Bill 3911 and was modeled on similar provisions of the False Claims Act. See id. at 5. 
94. See House Hearings, supra note 1, at 292-93. Moreover, the two limitations on when 
the fine may be implemented appear to be the basis for Representative Mc Collum's state­
ment that conditions were placed in the bill to "protect the small businessman." See 134 
CONG. REC. 10328 (1988). 
95. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
96. In fact, Representative Mc Collum is discussing "really tiny contracts with the Gov­
ernment." 134 CONG. REC. 10328 (emphasis added). In other words, he is discussing prime 
contracts, not subcontracts. 
97. See generally H.R. 3911, lOOth Cong. (1988). The bill was referred to the Senate af­
ter passing the full House by a vote of 419 to 0. See S. REP. No. 100-503, at 2 (1988), re­
printed in 1988 U. S.C.C.A.N. 5969, 5970. 
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ate Judiciary Committee modified the dollar threshold language from 
"if the value of the contract for such property or services is $1,000,000 
or more"9 8  to "if the value of the contract, subcontract, or any con­
stituent part thereof, for such property or services is $1,000,000 or 
more."99 Later, the full Senate further clarified application to subcon­
tractors by adding an explicit reference: the language "in any pro-
curement . . .  for the Government" was amended to read "in any pro-
curement . . . as a prime contractor with the United States or as a 
subcontractor or supplier on a contract in which there is a prime con­
tract with the United States."100 While other changes made by the Sen­
ate dull the teeth of the bill, the changes did not address the primary 
liability issue and gave no additional protection to low-value subcon­
tractors.101 
C. Ambiguity in the Senate Report 
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the disagreement between the 
Second and Fourth Circuits is the opposite interpretations of the same 
sentence of the Senate Report for the Act.10 2  The sentence is con­
tained in a passage attempting to clarify the meaning of the phrase 
"value of the contract." The Senate Report states: 
Section 1031(a) applies to procurement fraud "if the value of the con­
tract, subcontract, or any constituent part thereof ... is $1,000,000 or 
more." The phrase "value of the contract" refers to the value of the con­
tract award, or the amount the government has agreed to pay to the pro­
vider of services whether or not this sum represents a profit to the con­
tracting company. Furthermore, a subcontractor awarded a subcontract 
valued at $1,000,000 or more is covered by this section, regardless of the 
98. See H.R. 3911, lOOth Cong. The text under debate in the House hearings, therefore, 
did not even mention subcontractors. Nevertheless, both supporters and opponents of the 
bill assumed that the bill covered subcontractors. 
99. Id. What this phrase means and its explanation in Senate Report 503 are items of 
fundamental disagreement between the Second and Fourth Circuits. See infra Section 11.C. 
100. See 134 CONG. REC. 31569 (1988). The Second Circuit's reading of the statute that 
the "contractor ... subcontractor" phrase should "track" the "contract . . . subcontract" 
phrase, see supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text, is further weakened because the two 
phrases were added at two different times by two different groups. 
101. For example, one change reduced the maximum fine under the bill from 
$10,000,000 to $5,000,000. See H. R. 3911, lOOth Cong. Similarly, another change required 
that the amount of any fine be proportional to the offense, and a third established a maxi­
mum fine of $10,000,000 for multiple-count prosecutions. See id. These changes affected the 
penalty magnitude, but not the reach, of the bill. The Senate limited the scope only by fur­
ther extending Representative Mc Collum's limitations to the alternate fine. Specifically, the 
amount-of-the-fraud threshold was increased from $250,000 to $500,000, and the endanger­
ment threshold was changed from a "foreseeable and substantial risk" to a "conscious or 
reckless risk" standard. See id. 
102. See United States v. Brooks, 111 F.3d 365, 370 (4th Cir. 1997); United States v. 
Nadi, 996 F.2d 548, 551 (2d Cir. 1993). 
December 200 ] Prosecution of Minor Subcontractors 685 
amount of the contract award to the contractor or other subcontrac­
tors.103 
The Fourth Circuit concluded that the "Senate report explanation 
supports the interpretation that the statute applies to the entire pro­
curement effort where any contractual component has a value of $1 
million or more."104 On the other hand, the Second Circuit read the 
same language and concluded that "the committee instructs that, in 
the case of a subcontractor, the value of the subcontract is controlling 
and not the value of the prime contract or other subcontract. . . .  "105 
The Second Circuit interpretation, however, is unsupported by the 
legislative history as a whole and, accordingly, should not be fol­
lowed.106 Even before the Senate added specific subcontractor lan­
guage to the bill, both proponents and opponents assumed low-value 
subcontractors would be covered.107 The legislative history is also re­
plete with examples where small subcontractors are the fraudulent ac­
tors.1 0 8 Congress specifically focused on small subcontractor cases such 
as Spring Works: "While these criminal schemes are often life threat­
ening and can have a disastrous effect on the ability of our troops to 
complete their mission, we have not received a significant sentence on 
most of these cases."109 
The Senate Report's language that a $1,000,000 subcontract trig­
gers application of the Act regardless of the value of a particular 
prime contract is meant to clarify the Act's application to subcontrac­
tors that might be exempted if only the value of the prime contract 
was considered.U 0  The record does not suggest that the report even 
considered the question of which agreement is "controlling" to be 
relevant. The report says merely that the subcontract value is adequate 
for application, but the Second Circuit's inference of necessity is not 
103. S. REP. No. 100-503, at 12 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U. S. C. C.A.N. 5969, 5975-76. 
104. Brooks, 111 F.3d at 370. 
105. Nadi, 996 F.2d at 551. The Second Circuit continues: "The committee . . .  appar­
ently had in mind situations where an individual subcontract is of greater value than the 
prime contract. We may infer from this that, where the subcontract is of lesser value than the 
contract, the value of the subcontract is also controlling." Id. at 551. 
106. See Simon v. Commissioner, 68 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1995) ("In light of the overrid­
ing legislative intent . . .  we cannot employ two sentences in a legislative report to trump 
statutory language and a clearly stated legislative purpose."). 
107. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text. 
108. See House Hearings, supra note 1, at 167 (listing cases). The Spring Works case 
provides a compelling example. In that case, the subcontract value was reported to be only 
$160, see Brooks, 111  F.3d at 369, yet the cost to the government exceeded $1,500,000 and 
failure of the substandard parts could have caused a loss of life. See United States v. Spring 
Works, Inc., No. C R  86-1112- WM B ( C.D. Cal. April 6, 1987) (sentencing memorandum), 
reprinted in House Hearings, supra note 1, at 175. 
109. Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 43. 
1 10. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
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supported by the report. Moreover, reading the Senate's comment to 
narrow application of the Act is grossly inconsistent with the overall 
intent of Congress to develop an expansive, stand-alone statute to ad­
dress cases of contract fraud committed against the United States.111 
Correctly, the Fourth Circuit's interpretation that the statute ap­
plies when the value of any contractual component exceeds 
$1,000,00011 2  is consistent with the Act's entire legislative history.113 
The Fourth Circuit did not rely on an inference, but simply took the 
report at face value. Accordingly, this interpretation should be fol­
lowed by other courts in the future. 
III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS: WHY Do IT THE HARD WAY? 
This Part argues that prosecution of low-value subcontractors un­
der the Act is desirable because it facilitates fair and efficient prosecu­
tions that send a clear symbolic message. Section III.A demonstrates 
that use of a statute that has been narrowly tailored toward fraud by 
government contractors is preferable because its use is more straight­
forward and efficient than are other potential means of prosecution, 
even if some redundancy exists. Moreover, as argued in Section III.B, 
equalization of penalties caused by the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
negates arguments that the Act should not apply to subcontractors be­
cause of severe and disproportionate punishments. 
A. Superiority of a Stand-Alone Statute 
Use of the Act in this context is desirable because of benefits in­
herent in a narrowly tailored statute. Specifically, application of the 
Act enables straightforward and efficient prosecutions and allows 
utilization of a statute that has been tailored toward fraud in a con­
tract setting.114 
Congress recognized these benefits during the legislative develop­
ment of the Act. During Senate hearings, the Justice Department 
identified the creation of a general fraud crime as, in itself, reason to 
support the Act.115 The Department pointed to the benefits of a similar 
111. See S. REP. NO. 100-503, at 11-12 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U. S. C. C.A.N. 5969, 
5975-76. Had narrowing liability been the goal, the Senate might have said "a subcontrac­
tor . . . is covered . . .  only . . . .  " Instead, the report uses the expansive language "a subcon­
tractor . . .  is covered . . .  regardless . . . .  " 
112. See Brooks, 111  F.3d at 370. 
1 13. See Sections II.A and 11.B. 
114. See Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the 
Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 203, 280-81 (1982) (discussing efficiency concerns in the 
interpretation of criminal statutes). 
115. See Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 60 ("There are really five significant provi­
sions in this piece of legislation . . . .  The first is the creation of the general fraud crime in the 
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stand-alone statute, the Bank Fraud Act, passed in 1984.1 16 The 
Department asserted that the Bank Fraud Act had "facilitated and 
simplified the prosecution of hundreds of cases throughout the coun­
try."117 Based on this observation, the Department recommended that 
Congress consider enacting the general fraud provision of the Act as a 
stand-alone felony and that the $1,000,000 contract threshold apply as 
a trigger not for prosecution but for enhanced penalties.1 1 8  
Members of Congress also recognized these benefits. Indeed, crea­
tion of a free-standing statute was identified as one of the main pur­
poses of the Act.1 1 9 Representative Hughes noted, "At the present 
time . . .  [w]e have to shop around. Can we put it within mail fraud? 
Can we put in within wire fraud? . . .  We have no free-standing fraud 
statute as such."120 Similar motivation and desire for a stand-alone 
statute were evidenced when Congress passed the earlier Bank Fraud 
Act.121 
The primacy of laws targeting specific, as opposed to general, kinds 
of criminal activity is also reflected in courts' interpretations of con­
flicting statutes. The Supreme Court has concluded that a specific 
policy embodied in a later statute should control over an older, more 
general statute.122 Similarly, a canon of statutory construction dictates 
that, wherever a conflict exists, the more specific law should prevail 
over the more general.1 23 While these holdings deal with cases of con­
flict, the logic reflects the conclusion that the law that more precisely 
addresses the issue better reflects legislative policy than does a law 
that is merely peripheral. 
procurement process. This idea is very similar to what we had in the bank fraud area several 
years ago when we came here asking for help ... . ") (statement of Deputy Assistant Attor­
ney General Victoria Toensing). This basis for support was not as prominent during the ear­
lier House hearings, perhaps because the effects of the Sentencing Guidelines were less un­
derstood at that time. 
116. See id. 
117. Id. at 65. 
118. See id. at 70. 
119. See House Hearings, supra note 1, at 311 (statement of Rep. Hughes) ("One of the 
criticisms leveled by the panel of H. R. 3911 is that it will not increase the number of fraud 
cases. It is not the purpose, really, of this bill to do that. The purpose is to deter. And in the 
second place, to provide a freestanding statute that will cover acts of fraud against the 
United States Government . . . . "). 
120. See id. at 300. 
121. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 377-78 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U. S. C. C.A.N. 3182, 
3517-19 ("This approach of prosecuting bank fraud under statutes not specifically designed 
to reach this criminal conduct is necessarily problematic. "). 
122. See United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U. S. 517, 530 (1998). 
123. See, e.g. , Security Pac. Nat'! Bank v. Resolution Trust Corp., 63 F.3d 900, 904 (9th 
Cir. 1995) ("Generally a more specific provision of an enactment prevails [over], in the sense 
of making an exception to, a more general provision. "). 
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Moreover, Congress passed the Act also to send a symbolic mes­
sage of no tolerance for fraud against the government, even if the Act 
was redundant with pre-existing statutes. One argument that could be 
made against applying the Act to low-value subcontractors is that 
other statutes could also be used to punish wrongdoers. This argument 
applies indiscriminately to both prime contractors and subcontractors, 
and the mere existence of alternative statutes that could serve as the 
basis of prosecution does not mean that the Act should not apply. 
The scope of the Act concededly does overlap with other criminal 
statutes. Prior to passage of the Act, contract fraud against the United 
States was typically prosecuted under a variety of more general stat­
utes.124 These include the False Claims Act, 1 25 the False Statements 
Act,126 and statutes against conspiracy to defraud.12 7 Similarly, the Mail 
Fraud128 and Wire Fraud129 statutes were sometimes used to reach 
cases where the mail or telephone was used to execute the fraud.13° Fi­
nally, state fraud statutes could also be used as a means of prosecu­
tion.131 
One might incorrectly conclude, then, that use of the Act in cases 
of low-value subcontractors is not appropriate or necessary to prose­
cute the wrongdoers.132 Opponents of the Act argued that it should not 
124. See House Hearings, supra note 1, at 77. 
125. 18 u.s.c. §§ 286-287 (1994). 
126. 18 u.s.c. § 1001 (1994). 
127. 18 u.s.c. § 371 (1994). 
128. 18 u.s.c. §§ 1341-1342 (1994). 
129. 18 u.s.c. § 1343 (1994). 
130. Noncriminal means are also available to address fraud. In 1986, Congress passed 
the False Claims Ame.ndment Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153 (codified at 31 
U. S.C. § 3701 (1994)), and the Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
509, 100 Stat. 1874 (codified at 31 U. S.C. § 3801 (1994)), to strengthen civil deterrents. These 
provisions raised civil and criminal penalties for violations involving fraud and false claims, 
provided protection for "whistleblowers," and strengthened provisions relating to qui tam 
suits involving government fraud. See Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 10; House Hearings, 
supra note 1, at 9, 10, 192. Moreover, independent of judicial sanctions, government contrac­
tors can be debarred from future contracts. See House Hearings, supra note 1, at 126-30. 
131. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32 ( Vernon 1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 
750.280 (1991) (specifying penalties for any person convicted of "any gross fraud or cheat at 
common law"). While opponents of the Act did look to the availability of alternative federal 
statutes, the presence of state criminal statutes was not invoked during committee testimony. 
As a general matter, a federal issue would seem to be involved when the federal government 
is the target of the crime and the appropriateness of federal legislation was not debated. 
132. The court in United States v. Brooks did believe that the Act was necessary to effec-
tively reach such parties: 
We believe that our reading of the statute is no more anomalous than one which allows small 
subcontractors to escape prosecution under the provision . . .  simply by ensuring that their 
own subcontract stays below the . .. jurisdictional amount. The Nadi court's interpretation 
could significantly undermine the purpose of the statute because pervasive fraud on a multi­
million dollar defense project would be unreachable under the statute . .. if it were perpe­
trated in multiple separate subcontracts . . ..  
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be passed because it offered nothing new: "Where is the evidence that 
[other] legislation has not done the job? In light of all this recent leg­
islation, we believe further activity in this area to be unnecessary, re­
dundant and - in fact - counterproductive."133 Even while strongly 
supporting passage of the Act in 1988, the Justice Department admit­
ted that "[g]enerally, we have not encountered situations where con­
duct relating to fraud against the United States does not fall within the 
prohibitions of one or more of the [other] statutes."134 
Possible redundancy or lack of necessity, however, does not invali­
date application if the language and history indicate that the Act does 
apply.135 While arguing the benefits of a stand-alone statute, the 
Justice Department cited the Bank Fraud Act,13 6  which was passed by 
Congress in 1984 even though "[t]he great majority of cases of bank 
fraud we encountered were cognizable under [the] old statutes . . . .  "137 
Even if the statute is largely - or solely - a symbolic means of fo­
cusing attention on a particular type of crime, its symbolic function 
does not undermine its force as law.13 8 
Moreover, although other means of prosecution are available, this 
redundancy applies to both low-value and high-value contractors. In 
other words, the Act undeniably applies to large prime contractors de­
spite the existence of these same alternative means of prosecution. Al­
though large prime contractors may be comparatively harder to punish 
and deter than smaller subcontractors,139 that distinction alone cannot 
remove subcontractors from the scope of liability. 
111 F.3d 365, 369 (4th Cir. 1997). 
133. House Hearings, supra note 1, at 284-85; see also id. at 384-85. 
134. Id. at 34. 
135. See Connecticut Nat'!. Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 253 (1992) (" Redundancies 
across statutes are not unusual events in drafting ....  "). 
136. 18 u.s.c. § 1344 (1994). 
137. Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 65. 
138. See Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The Patholo­
gies of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation Reform 
Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1, 84-85 (1997) (discussing a category of laws they call "symbolic statutes " 
that are not truly instrumental but rather express who we are as a society). 
139. Large contractors do have greater political and economic power than do low-value 
subcontractors. Representative Hughes stated in testimony before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee that the ongoing procurement scandal in 1988 "suggests . . .  that our current 
Federal statutes are not providing a sufficient deterrent. " Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 
25. Hughes and other members of Congress reached this conclusion based on findings that 
many large contractors simply had too much power to be punished adequately under the 
existing law. See House Hearings, supra note 1, at 100. Similarly, because the biggest contrac­
tors hold such a large share of the market, deterrence through debarment may not be effec­
tive. See id. at 130. Representative Hughes remarked, "I find that the small contractors are 
being dealt with very harshly but the larger ones are basically being restored. General Dy­
namics is a good example since they were restored within five months." Id. 
690 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 99:669 
These arguments of redundancy and lack of necessity were raised 
by opponents to the Act before its passage, and were simply rejected 
by Congress. Regardless of the sympathy that smaller businesses tend 
to attract, even those that are fraudulent actors, the rationale sup­
porting a stand-alone statute is just as strong when applied to subcon­
tractors as to any other fraudulent actor. 
B. Equalization of Punishment 
Arguments that the Act should not be applied to low-value sub­
contractors because the magnitude of the penalty will be unfair also 
are not persuasive. Although Congress intended the Act to carry 
heightened penalties, the subsequent enactment of the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines creates punishments that are, by design, pro­
portional to the magnitude of the offense.140 
Although the language and history of the Act direct that it should 
be applied to cases of low-value subcontractor fraud, some courts may 
still consider prosecution to be unfair.141 Similarly, some courts may be 
hesitant to allow prosecution under the Act if the penalty is perceived 
to lack proportion to the offense.142 This perspective stems from the 
observation that a mode of punishment necessary to deter large cor­
porations and contractors may not be necessary, and thus is not ap­
propriate, with respect to small businesses. Congress passed the Act as 
a means to reach wrongdoers who may not have been adequately de­
terred by the pre-existing penalties,143 and thus one might think that 
heightened penalties may not be justified as applied to smaller entities. 
As discussed above, contract fraud potentially may also be prose­
cuted under a variety of other statutes.144 Statutory instruction on im­
prisonment and fines is limited under the various alternative stat-
140. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines were authorized in the Sentencing Reform Act 
of 1984. 28 U.S.C. § 994 (1994). Congressional debate on the Act in 1987 and 1988 occurred 
less than one year after the Sentencing Commission's initial guidelines took effect. See 
THOMAS W. HUTCHISON ET AL., FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW AND PRACTICE 1-2 (2000). 
141. See United States v. Nadi, 996 F.2d 548, 551 (2d Cir. 1993) (limiting application so 
as to avoid "the potential anomaly of small subcontractors . . .  being prosecuted under the 
Act "). 
142. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983). This case was cited by the U. S. Chamber 
of Commerce in hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee. See Senate Hearings, supra 
note 1, at 161. But see Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U. S. 957, 965 (1991) (holding that Eighth 
Amendment does not require the magnitude of the punishment to be proportional to the 
offense). 
143. See generally George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. 
ECON. 526 (1970) (discussing efficiency and the adequacy of deterrence under criminal stat-
ute enforcement regimes). 
· 
144. See supra note 55. 
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utes.145 In general, like the Act, these statutes provide upper limits on 
the penalties to be levied.146 
Although the statutory language of the False Claims Act, False 
Statements Act, Mail Fraud Act, Wire Fraud Act and the Major Fraud 
Act differ in some respects, all of the acts require that penalties be de­
termined in accordance with section 2Fl.1 of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines related to fraud and deceit.147 While the conspiracy statute 
does not explicitly reference section 2Fl.l, section 2Xl.1 links cases of 
conspiracy to the underlying substantive violation of fraud.14 8 Unlike 
the threshold provision of the Act that ties application to the value of 
the contract,149 punishment - both fines and imprisonment - under 
the Guidelines depends primarily on the amount of "loss."150 In other 
words, the punishment is intended to be proportional to the harm 
caused by the offense.151 
Defining loss under the Guidelines is itself a disputed issue.152 The 
application notes (which are guidance materials prepared by the 
Sentencing Commission that accompany section 2Fl.1), however, con­
tain specific instructions with respect to contract fraud and indicate 
that loss includes consequential damages: 
[L]oss in a procurement fraud or product substitution case includes not 
only direct damages , but also consequential damages that were reasona­
bly foreseeable. For example, in a case involving a defense product sub­
stitution offense, the loss includes the government 's reasonably foresee­
able costs of ma king substitute transactions . . . . Similarly . . . loss 
includes the reasonably foreseeable administrative cost to the govern -
145. For example, the False Claims Act, lS U. S. C. § 287 (1994), and the False State­
ments Act, 18 U. S. C. § 1001 (1994), provide only that punishment include fines under "this 
title " and imprisonment of not more than five years. 
146. The Act provides that, in general, fines should not exceed $1,000,000 and that im­
prisonment should not exceed ten years. 18 U. S. C. § 1031(a) (1994). 
147. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. A (2000) (providing an index of 
applicable Guidelines Manual sections by statute). 
148. See United States v. Tatum, 138 F.3d 1344, 1346-47 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that 
procurement fraud guidelines under Section 2Fl.1 should be applied in cases of conspiracy 
to defraud the government). 
149. See 18 U.S.C. 103l(a). 
150. U S SG § 2Fl.l (b)(l). 
151. This aspect of proportionality was one of the goals of the Sentencing Reform Act 
of 1994, which sought to minimize differences in punishment for the same underlying con­
duct. See HUTCHISON, supra note 140, at 2. 
152. See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez, 199 F.3d 1328 (4th Cir. 1999) (remanding a 
conviction under the Act and other statutes for recalculation of the amount of loss and re­
sentencing); United States v. Sublett, 124 F.3d 693, 695 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that the 
amount of loss should be decreased to account for legitimate services actually provided, even 
if the services were fraudulently provided); Tris Felix & Jason P. Hoffman, Note, The Fed­
eral Judiciary in Discord: What is the Meaning of "Loss" Under the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines Governing Fraud Offenses?, 35 WASHBURN L.J. 179 (1995). This dispute will af­
fect sentencing regardless of whether the Act or an alternative statute is used. 
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ment and other participant s of repeating or correcting the procurement 
action affected . . . . 1 53 
This provision ensures that the full extent of the harm, rather than an 
amount such as the contract value or profit, be considered when de­
termining an appropriate punishment. 
Moreover, following provisions introduced as part of the Act, the 
Guidelines provide that in cases involving "conscious or reckless risk 
of serious bodily injury" the offense level be increased by two levels to 
a minimum level of twelve.154 This provision creates a minimum sen­
tence of one year and increases sentences by approximately six 
months.1 55 This additional penalty addresses what Congress believed 
to be especially egregious cases where substitution of defective prod­
ucts could endanger the lives of military personnel. Although this por­
tion of the Sentencing Guidelines was added in conjunction with the 
Act, courts have held that it applies even when the Act is not the basis 
of the prosecution.156 
These effects of the Sentencing Guidelines were anticipated at the 
time of passage of the Act. The Department of Justice noted before 
the House Judiciary Committee: 
[A ]n initia l reading of the guide line s would sugge st that a fir st of fender, 
the typica l defendant in procurement cases, who organized a group ... 
which conducted a ... fraud costing the Government more than $5 mi l­
lion, would receive a guideline sentence of 46 to 57 months. This guide­
line sentence, ari sing out of a very serious fraud, would be within the 
[five -year ] statutory maximum permitted by existing law . . . .  1 57 
The Department nonetheless supported the seven-year maximum be­
cause it believed that the Sentencing Commission might amend the 
Guidelines or that a judge might use the Act as a basis for departing 
upward from the prescribed sentence.1 5 8  In the subsequent ten years, 
the Sentencing Commission responded only by providing clarification 
of the calculation of the loss.159 Under the 1998 Guidelines, a sentence 
of seven years for a first-time offender would be possible only if the 
153. U S SG § 2Fl.1, cmt. n. 8(c). 
154. Id. § 2Fl.1(7). 
155. See id. § 5A. 
156. See, e.g., United States v. McCord, Inc., 143 F.3d 1095, 1097 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding 
that enhancement for "conscious or reckless risk " can apply in prosecutions under the False 
Statements Act); United States v. Hall, 71 F.3d 569, 571 (6th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that the 
enhancement can apply in cases where the fraud itself creates the risk but declining to apply 
the enhancement when the risk was created during flight from the police). 
157. House Hearings, supra note 1, at 31. 
158. See id. at 52-53. 
159. See U S SG § 2Fl.1, cmt. n. 7. 
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loss exceeded $40,000,000 and the fraud involved a conscious or reck­
less risk of serious bodily harm.160 
The effects of the Guidelines on fines similarly prevent punish­
ments under the Act that might be considered unfair. Section 2F1.1 of 
the Sentencing Guidelines Manual does not contain special rules re­
garding fines, and thus fines are determined following the general 
Guidelines rule.161 With respect to organizational defendants, base 
fines may exceed $20,000,000, and these base fines may be further 
multiplied under the Guidelines.162 Given the Act's limit of 
$10,000,000, fines of organizational defendants under the Act may ac­
tually be limited compared to alternative statutes that simply provide 
for fines "under this title." 
The situation is somewhat different for fines for individual defen­
dants. While maximum fines for individuals are normally $250,000,163 
that maximum does not apply if, as in this case, the statute authorizes 
a greater maximum fine.164 Notwithstanding the standard limit, how­
ever, another section of the criminal code provides for an alternative 
maximum fine of twice the gain or loss associated with a fraud,165 and 
this alternative maximum is available in prosecutions using alterna­
tives to the Act. A fine exceeding the normal maximum of $250,000 
would be available under the Act and would be appropriate given the 
listed factors166 only in circumstances in which a large loss was suf­
fered. These same circumstances would also allow fines that exceed 
$250,000 based on the section of the code allowing for fines based on 
the amount of loss or gain, even without the statutory maximum pro­
vided by the Act. The Act's heightened maximum fine provisions, 
therefore, have little effect when compared with the alternative law. 
In sum, the punishment a wrongdoer receives will be equivalent 
whether prosecuted under the Act or an alternative statute. Therefore, 
objections to prosecution based on a concern over disproportionate 
punishment are not persuasive. 
160. See id. §§ 2Fl.1 ,  5A. Sentences for repeat offenders can more easily reach the 
seven-year maximum sentence. 
161. See id. §§ 5El.2(b ), 8 C2.4(b ). 
162. See id. § 8C2.4(d). 
163. See id. § 5El.2( c )(2). 
164. See id. § 5El.2(c)(4). 
165. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3571(b)(2), 3571(d) (1994). This alternative maximum is also re­
ferred to in the Act. See 18 U. S. C. § 1031(d) (1994). 
166. See 18 U. S. C. § 1031(e). These factors mirror those used by the Sentencing Guide­
lines to establish the severity of punishment. See U S SG § 5El.2. 
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CONCLU SION 
The Major Fraud Act is the appropriate statute under which to 
prosecute both contractors and subcontractors that have committed 
fraud against the United States. Language within the Act limiting li­
ability to cases where "the value of the contract, subcontract, or any 
constituent part . . .  is $1,000,000 or more"167 should not be interpreted 
to exclude from prosecution subcontractors on prime contracts with 
the government that exceed $1,000,000, even if the value of the spe­
cific subcontract is less than $1,000,000. Rather, the statute and its 
legislative history support prosecution of low-value subcontractors, as 
does the broader policy desire to utilize criminal statutes that are spe­
cifically tailored to the underlying offense. 
Although less of a political issue than in the late 1980s, 168 fraud 
against the government continues to be a significant fiscal issue. The 
Department of Defense alone, for example, has a total annual budget 
approaching $300 billion and spends approximately $200 billion of that 
on defense contracts.16 9 Recent defense spending increases are the 
largest since the mid-1980s, when the fraud scandals that led to the 
Act occurred,170 and the George W. Bush administration has identified 
further increases as a priority.171 Despite the reforms of the past dozen 
years, the General Accounting Office considers defense contracting to 
be at high risk for fraud and other abuses,1 72 and fraud continues to 
167. 18 u.s.c. § 1031 (1994). 
168. A 2000 Gallup survey indicated that sixteen percent of people identified "educa­
tion, " the most frequent response, as the country's "most important problem, " with all eco­
nomic issues accounting for Jess than thirty percent of responses. Government waste was not 
specifically identified among the responses. See Frank Newport, Economy, Education, 
Health, Crime and Morality Most on American's Minds, GALLUP ORGANIZATION, June 22, 
2000 available at <http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr000622b.asp>. For "most important 
problem " survey results, see <http://www.gallup.com/po!Uindicators/lndmip.asp>. In com­
parison, during testimony on the Act, witness Dina Rasor, of the non-profit group Project on 
Military Procurement, referred to a September 1988 U.S. News and World Report poll in 
which eighty-six percent of respondents answered that the next president should devote 
more resources to fighting waste and fraud and abuse within the government. See House 
Hearings, supra note 1 ,  at 100. 
169. See Greg Schneider, Pentagon Seeks to Aid Defense Contractors, WASH. POST, Feb. 
8, 2000, at El; Dividing Defense Dollars, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 1998, at A23. 
170. See Eric Pianin & Dan Morgan, Congress Tapping Surplus for Tax Cuts, Domestic 
Programs, WASH. POST, July 21, 2000, at A4; Eric Pianin, Legislative Outlook is Mostly Dim, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 1999, at A4. These recent increases have been criticized by some on the 
grounds that the dollars could be found by trimming "pork " from the acquisition programs. 
See Editorial, More Realistic Defense Budgeting, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1999, at A16. 
171. See Thomas E. Ricks & Hanna Rosin, Bush Pledges Safety of Social Security, 
WASH. POST, June 7, 2000, at A6; Roberto Suro, Joint Chiefs Aim Big Budget Request at 
Next President, WASH. POST, June 5, 2000, at Al. 
172. See Stephen Barr, Identifying Risky Programs: GAO Lists 5 More as Vulnerable to 
Fraud, Waste, Abuse, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 1997, at A23; see generally U.S. GENERAL 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HIGH-RISK SERIES: DEFENSE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT (1997). 
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make the news.173 Whether a particular bad actor happens to be the 
prime or subcontractor should not limit the ability of the United States 
to prosecute under the Act. 
173. See Lorraine Adams, Contractors in the Dock: 21 Charged After Undercover Probe 
of Navy Fraud, WASH. POST, Aug. 20, 1999, at A33. 
